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Hedging Crop Risk with Weather Index and Individual Crop Insurance 
 
Abstract 
While individual crop insurance and the potential weather index are valuable instruments 
in managing agricultural risk, the problems of asymmetric information (moral hazard and 
adverse selection) in individual crop insurance induce large transaction cost and imperfect 
correlation between individual realization and specific weather event creates unfavorable basis 
risk. This paper provides a theoretical analysis for the optimal portfolio of weather index and 
individual crop insurance in farm level under the mean-variance framework and stresses the 
impacts of risk aversion level, transaction cost, and basis risk. An empirical application of corn 
farms using data in Todd county of Kentucky is applied to. 
Introduction  
Agriculture is particularly prone to risk among economic activities. Risk-reducing 
practices involve behavior that is performed before and after the risky event, aimed to securing 
sources of remedial income in the event of loss. Dillon has provided evidence that production 
risk can be reduced through crop diversification, varied planting data, and alteration across 
different maturity class. However, these practices have certain limitations and ultimately reduce 
farm profits in the long run.  
Crop insurance and weather index based products can be valuable instruments in 
managing production risk. For example, farmers can protect crop yields loss using the individual 
crop insurance when the yield is less than a predetermined target, or potential weather 
derivatives when the underlying weather index is below the pre-specified strike. Individual crop 
insurance provides indemnities based on the realized individual yields, that is, the payment can 
be incurred by weather-related loss and other unavoidable perils, or even bad management.  
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Meanwhile, weather index offers payment that relies on some specific weather events, that is 
correlated, but not 100%, with the individual crop yields. Therefore, the problems of asymmetric 
information (moral hazard and adverse selection) induce large transaction cost (e.g., 
administration cost, monitoring cost, inspection cost) while the imperfect correlation between 
individual realization and specific weather event creates the basis risk
2.  
This paper provides a theoretical model and empirical application for the optimal 
portfolio of individual crop insurance and weather index and highlights the trade-off between 
transaction costs and basis risk under a mean-variance framework. Four parts are included in this 
article. First, the problem is addressed along with a review of the literature. Second, the 
theoretical framework to model the simultaneous demand for individual crop insurance and 
weather index is developed using a mean-variance model.  Third, an empirical application is 
provided using data from rainfall and corn yields in Todd county of Kentucky.  Fourth, 
conclusions and recommendations are developed. 
Background 
Crop insurance has been a part of U.S. federal policy for a long time. Since 1938, the 
federal government has included crop insurance programs as part of the set of policies for the 
agricultural sector. In 2002, the estimated number of crop insurance policies exceeded 1.25 
million with total liabilities exceeding $37 billion (Ker and Ergun). The transaction cost involved 
in crop insurance program is relatively high because of the asymmetric information (moral 
hazard and adverse selection) (Goodwin; Skees, 2001a; Skees; Smith and Goodwin; Skees and 
Reed), thus federal government has to subsidize this program for its viability. For example, 
                                                 
2 Actually, individual crop insurance is also inherent with the basis risk because of the sampling error and 
measurement error, but this point is beyond the scope of our paper.  
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Goodwin estimated that the loss ratio is approximately 1.88 during 1981-99 periods for the crop 
insurance program of U.S. 
Agricultural production is sensitive to weather variations, especially to varying levels of 
temperature or precipitation. Rosenzweig and Binswanger utilize panel data from rural South 
India investments, wealth and rainfall to measure the riskiness of farmers’ investment portfolios 
in terms of their sensitivity to weather variation. Their results show that the asset portfolios are 
significantly influenced by the degree of rainfall variability. In particular, farmers in riskier 
environments select portfolios of assets that are less sensitive to rainfall variation. Furthermore, 
the intra-temporal variation of large-area crop yields is mainly caused by weather variation and 
systemic risk explains a large portion of the variability of the producer’s income.  
The application of weather based products in agriculture is potent though it is still in 
fledging stage and only a few successive weather trades have been completed for agricultural 
users. For example, Turvey reported that Agricorp, the crown corporation charged with 
providing crop insurance to Ontario farmers, have initiated a pilot program for forage insurance 
with a rainfall insurance plan in the spring of 2000. Skees (2001b) suggested that three classes 
that link the agricultural risk and weather events have motivate the particular interests: 1) Crop 
yield risk; 2) Livestock risk; 3) Environment and natural resource risk.  
The advantages of index products over the traditional insurance products are free of 
moral hazard and adverse selection since the indemnity depends on the specified weather 
variable rather than actual losses such as crop failure. The underwriting of weather index is also 
less costly since they do not require individual contracts, onsite inspection and loss evaluation. 
However, producers may have to face a higher level of basis risk, that is, an individual can have 
a loss and not be paid because the weather variables are not completely correlated with the yield.   
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Obviously, the decision to purchase insurance or weather index products will be affected 
by the degree of risk aversion level, the transaction cost insured by individual crop insurance and 
the basis risk induced by weather index. The objective of this paper is to analyze the optimal 
portfolio of individual crop insurance and weather index at the farm level and provide the 
evidences for the trade-off between transaction cost and basis risk across different risk aversion 
levels of the producers.  
Theoretical Analysis 
A risk-averse producer faces risks of production, which is contingent upon some weather 
conditions. Therefore, crop yield can be orthogonally decomposed into two parts. One is 
systematic risk that comes from adverse weather condition; the other is the idiosyncratic 
(residual) component which reflects the individual’s variability not stemming from weather and 
uncorrelated with weather conditions. This decomposition is reasonable since systemic risk in 
agriculture is mainly attributable to the impact of extensively unfavorable weather such as 
drought or flood, which affects the crop yields of a large geographic region simultaneously. 
Therefore, the individual yield
3 can be written as 
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3 The tildes (~) denotes a random variables.  
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Miranda first formalized this framework in designing the optimal area-yield crop 
insurance. In our model, we decompose the individual crop yield deviation from expectation into 
a systematic component measured by the deviations of the weather condition (w ~ ), and an 
idiosyncratic component i ε ~ . The coefficient  i β quantifies the sensitivity of the deviations of crop 
yield to the deviations of the weather conditions. Here, w ~ can be measured by a unique weather 
variable, such as precipitation, temperature, or a combination of several related weather 
variables, such as rainfall or temperature. The optimal decision of this weather index contract 
will depend on the beta coefficient which measures the sensitivity of individual crop yield to the 
weather conditions.  
Assume the producer is only facing production risk and the output price is normalized to 
be unity without a loss of generality. The producer can use two instruments to manage 
production risk: individual crop insurance and weather index. Furthermore, we assume that 
individual crop insurance is sold at an actuarially unfair price because of high transaction cost 
while weather index is sold at actuarially fair price. Suppose that the indemnity and premium are 
both denominated in production units, that is, bushels per acre. Production costs are also ignored 
in this analysis
4. For notational convenience, the subscript i has been dropped out within below 
analysis.  
The individual crop insurance is established based on the yield shortfall between the 
actual harvest yield ( y ~) and the guaranteed yield ( c y ). This policy can be described by the 
couple [ P I ), (• ] where  ) ~ (y I be the indemnity function and P be the premium.  
(2) ) 0 ), ~ (( ) ~ ( y y Max y I c − =  
(3)  0 )) ~ ( ( ) 1 ( ≥ + = y I E P λ   
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whereλ  be loading factor
5 and E be the expectation operator. The linear relationship of 
premium and expected indemnity implies that transaction cost is proportional to claims. 
Intuitively,  1






if the loading factor is positive, that is, a marginal increase in coverage 
is costly because the increase in premium would be larger than the increase in expected payment. 
Meanwhile, subsidized crop insurance can introduce production in external margins since the 
marginal increase in coverage is relatively cheaper. 
The design of the weather index is followed by the European precipitation options 
proposed by Skees and Zeuli (1999) and it is in the form of puts options. This policy can be 
described by the couple [ Q J ), (• ] where  ) ~ (w J be the indemnity function and Q be the premium. 
(4) ) 0 ), ~ (( ) ~ ( w w Max w J c − × =θ  
(5)  )) ~ ( ( w I E Q =  
where c w be predetermined weather conditions and θ  be the tick (bushel/unit of index). 
With the purchase of the individual crop insurance and the weather index, the producer’s 
net revenue can be represented by 
(6) ) ) ~ ( ( ) ) ~ ( ( ~ ~ ' Q w J n P y I A y A y
net − + − + =  
where A be the total acre of land available, 
` A is the acre of insured land
6, ] , 0 [ ' A A∈ , and 
n is the amount of weather index policy purchased by the producer.  
  The mean of the net revenue is given by 
(7) )) ~ ( ( ' ) ~ ( y I E A A y E
net λ µ − =  
  The variance of the net revenue can be measured by 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 If production costs are correlated with the crop yields, then the problem becomes more complicated 
5 Actually, λ can even be a negative number because of high subsidies in crop insurance program in U.S. (Skees, 
1999; Goodwin, 2001). Gollier (2003) estimated the loading factor around 0.3 for the casualty insurance case.  
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From the equality,  i i i i w w y ε β µ ~ ) ~ ( ~ + − + = . Assume that the non-systemic component 
i ε ~ and weather index w ~  are conditionally independent ( a mild assumption given that they are 
uncorrelated by definition). Then  i ε ~ and  ) ~ (w J are uncorrelated. We can rewrite  
(9) )) ~ ( , ~ ( )) ~ ( , ~ ( w J w Cov w J y Cov i β =  
Intuitively, we have, 0 )) ~ ( , ~ ( < w J w Cov , and  . 0 )) ~ ( ), ~ ( ( > w J y I Cov  
The mean-variance (EV) results have been shown to be consistent with the expected 
utility hypothesis under some conditions (Freund ; Meyer). The elicited set of alternatives is 
what is known as the “efficient frontier” for a decision maker that is assumed to have a positive 
preference for income and negative preference for variance. The optimal solution depends on the 
decision maker’s preference tradeoffs between expected returns and variance of returns, that is, 
risk aversion. The model can provide tractable solutions to many theoretical problems in risk 
analysis, but has limitations in that it assumes constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and 
normality in density function to be consistent with expected utility theory. 
Under the framework of EV model, the producer chooses a portfolio of the acre of 
insured land and the amount of weather index policy to maximize utility with risk adverse 
behavior. The objective function is given by 
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 Where  φ  is CARA coefficient. 
The first order condition gives us 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Assume that a producer can insure part of his own land based on his optimal decision.  
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  It follows from (13) and (14), we have 
Proposition 1. 
  The optimal amount of weather index purchased is decreasing with the acre of land 
insured. Thus we can deduce that weather index can act as a substitute for individual crop 
insurance. 
  Furthermore, we can define
) ~ ( ) ~ (
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σ σ
ρ = , with  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ , a measure of the 
correlation between individual crop insurance payment and weather index payment. Clearly, ρ  
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` = A , that is, only weather index is available for hedging production risk. The 
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β  as the critical beta, then, we have 
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The critical beta ( c β ), determined by the area weather conditions and rising with the 
targeted weather index ( c w ), is invariant among all producers within a given area. It thus follows 
from (15`): 
Proposition 2. 
If only weather index with actuarially fair price is available, the producer would always 
like to choose a fixed and nonnegative amount of weather index policy regardless of his risk 
aversion level. The optimal amount of weather index policy purchased is completely determined 
by, and is positively related to his individual beta coefficient  i β and the total acres of land A. 
Alternatively, provided that n=0, that is, only individual crop insurance is available, the 
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  Based on equations (16), we have: 
Proposition 3. 
•  The producer insures the crop  only if  )) ~ ( ( )) ~ ( , ~ ( y I E y I y ACov
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•  Ceteris paribus, the higher the risk averse producer is, the more land the producer would 
like to insure; 
•  Ceteris paribus, the larger the risk loading factor it is, the less insured land the producer 
would like to insure. However, the subsidized policy will increase the purchase of crop 
insurance. 
After rearrange the equation 13`) and 14`), the optimal combination of individual crop 
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Following Equation 18) and 19), we have proposition 4 as follows: 
Proposition 4. 
1) As long as  0
2
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y I y ACov w J w Cov A i , the producer will choose a portfolio of 
positive amount of weather index policy and insured land. The decision of purchase depends on 
the risk aversion level, the loading factor and the level of basis risk.  
2) Ceteris paribus, the higher risk averse the producer is, the more acre of insured land 
and the less amount of weather index the producer would like to choose, that is, the elasticity of  
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the substitution between individual crop insurance and  weather index is increasing with 
producer’ risk aversion level. 
3) Ceteris paribus, the larger the risk loading  factor it is, the less acre of insured land 
and the more amount of  weather index policy the producer would like to choose; However, the 
subsidized crop insurance will induce the opposite results and can crowd out  weather index 
from the market. 
4) The impact of basis risk is complicated since it depends on both of ρ  and i β . Under 
some conditions
7, ceteris paribus, the optimal purchase amount of weather index is increasing 
with high level of basis risk while the optimal acre of land insured is decreasing with basis risk. 
  Furthermore, we can derive the market enhancing of the combination of individual crop 
insurance and weather index. The added value of the individual insurance and weather index can 
be measured by the increasing utility. 
(19) ) 0 , 0 ( '*) *, ( U A n U U
net − = ∆  
  It is also possible to compare the cases in which only one of these two instruments is 
available for the producer. The simultaneous use of weather index and individual crop insurance 
should be market enhancing, that is, it allows the producer to increase the expected yield for the 
same level of yield variance or, equivalently, to reduce the yield variance for a given expected 
yield. 
Data and Empirical Results 
 Data 
A dataset of historical corn yields was applied for Todd County in Kentucky. The 
individual yield data set was a cross sectional time series of actual yields for 28 farmers that 
                                                 
7 For example, both  ρ and  ρ β / is an increasing function ofβ , a measure of basis risk.  
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participated in the federal crop insurance program between 1985 and 1994 with a ten years of 
APH record from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. County yield records were obtained 
from the National Agricultural Statistics Server (NASS).  
The yield data was detrended since the trend represents a systematic change in crop 
yields due to improved technologies and agricultural practices. The detrended yields are given by 
(20)      Adjusted Yieldt = (Actual yieldt / Trend yieldt)×Forecasted Based Yield 
Rainfall data is from the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather Center and the 
study utilizes data from 1985 to 1994 in nearest Bowling Green Weather Station. The rainfall is 
first aggregated in four different critical growth periods based on climate and plant physiology. 
Weights for these four periods are then assigned through a mathematical programming procedure 
that maximizes correlation between county yields and rainfall index. The vector of weights is 
then checked in order to make it consistent with agronomic information. The final value of the 
index is calculated by summing the values obtained by multiplying rainfall levels in each period 
by the specific weights assigned to a particular period. The summary is provided in table 1. 
  The beta coefficients ( i β ) are estimated from equation 1. The beta coefficients among the 
28 farmers are fit using a nonparametric kernel smoother. Figure 1 presents the smoothed 
probability density function for these data, suggesting that i β are bimodelly distributed.  
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Figure 2: The Kernel Distribution of Beta Coefficients 
The critical yield in equation 2) is defined by  y yc × = 85 . 0 and the critical weather index 
in equation 4) is defined by w wc = . The total land available is fixed at 1,000 acres. The optimal 
solutions were solved through a MP approach using CONOPT solver. Three relative risk levels 
are considered in this paper: low risk level, moderate risk level and high risk level.  The loading 
factor is first fixed by .33 in the first three scenarios and then varied in the last scenario to 
represent different levels of transaction cost. The results of four different scenarios are discussed 
as follows. 
Scenario1: Only Weather Index 
  The optimal results of n, 
net Y , and  U ∆ when only weather index is available for farmers 
are provided in the table 2. The farms are selected by every other in order of ascending beta 
value. The results show that the optimal amount of weather index policy is uniquely and 
positively related to the beta coefficients, regardless of the risk level. Furthermore, the market 
enhancing ( U ∆ ) is also increasing with the risk level. For example, the increased utilities for 15 
farm are 2041, 2915, and 3190 bushels with an fixed amount of 1538 weather index purchased, 
respectively across low, moderate, and high risk level.  
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Scenario2: Only Individual Crop Insurance 
  Table 3 provides optimal results for the insured land provided that only individual crop 
insurance is available. The results are consistent with our theoretical model that the higher risk 
level the farmer is, the more land he would like to insure. The increased utilities due to 
actuarially unfair individual crop insurance for farm 15 are 753 bushels with insuring 635 acres 
of land for low risk level, 2458 bushels with insuring 956 acres of land, and 4362 bushels with 
insuring all 1000 acres of land, respectively.  
Scenario3: A Portfolio of Weather Index and Individual Crop Insurance 
  Table 4 shows the optimal choices of a portfolio of weather index policy and insured 
land. The results are consistent with our expectation and the substitution of crop insurance and 
rainfall index is obvious. The producers with low risk levels prefer rainfall index due to its low 
transaction cost while those with high risk levels favor the individual crop insurance because of 
its low basis risk.  The increased utility corresponding to the optimal choices across different risk 
levels always bring at least the same utility as that corresponding to only using weather index or 
individual crop insurance. For example, farm 15 chooses 1538 weather index and zero insured 
land with an increased utility 2041 for the low risk level, 1242 weather index and 236 insured 
land with an increased utility 2956 for the moderate risk level, and 445 weather index and 871 
insured land with an increased utility 4505 for the high risk level. 
  Across different producers, the basis risk is varied. It is reasonable to assume that a 
farmer with a high of bothβ and ρ has a low basis risk. Our results generally support the 
hypothesis that the producer with a high basis would like to prefer more crop insurance rather 
than rainfall index. However, the results are not absolutely correct since we can not assume that 
all farmers are identical except that the basis risk.  
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Scenario4: Impact of Transaction Cost: Loading Factor 
  Farm 15 is chosen as a representative for analyzing impacts of changing loading factor. 
The loading factor is varied between 0 and 1. Figure 2 shows the negative relationship between 
the loading factor and insured land across different risk levels if only individual crop insurance is 
available. 
Figure 2. The Relation of Loading Factors 


































  Figure 3 shows the impact of loading factor on the optimal portfolio of rainfall index and 
individual crop insurance for the moderate risk level. When the loading factor is below 0.24, the 
producer fully insures his crop and purchases a fixed amount of 282 weather index policy; when 
the loading factor is beyond 0.355, the producer would like to purchase a up limit of 1538 
weather index and insure zero land; when the loading factor is in this interval, the producer 
would like to trade off the insured land with weather index to maximize his/her utility.  
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Figure 3. The Impact of Loading Factor on the 
Portfolio of Weather Index and Individual Crop 







































  Agriculture is plagued by numerous risks, and risk management is always an important 
component in the farmers’ decision-making. The paper provides a combination of individual 
crop insurance and innovative weather index as candidates in the portfolio of risk hedging for the 
producers. The emphasis is to analyze the impacts of the risk aversion level, transaction cost and 
the basis risk under a mean-variance model. 
The results indicate that producers can efficiently manage the risk through a combination 
of individual crop insurance and weather index and weather index can act as a substitute for the 
individual crop insurance. The empirical application using the weather and corn yield data from 
Todd county in Kentucky further demonstrate the substitution of individual crop insurance and 
weather index and suggest the market enhancing  of an optimal portfolio. 
We assume that producer is facing with only production risk and only one crop is 
available. In real world, farmers might select different crops and face up with several sources of 
risk, such as production risk, price risk, and credit risk. Further research can calibrate our model 
to several different crops in the portfolio and include the price risk with futures markets. 
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Table 1. Design of Weather Index 
  Critical Growth Period  Time Span  Weights 
1  Establishment  Apr 15-May 12  0.39 
2  Vegetative  May 13-June 2  0.26 
3  Pollination  June 3 – June 28  0.3 
4  Grainfilling  June 29 – August 15  0.05 
 
 
Table 2: The Optimal Results of Rainfall Index Contract 
      Low Risk Level  Moderate Risk Level  High Risk Level 
Farm Beta Corr  n  Ynet  deltaU  n Ynet  deltaU  n Ynet  DeltaU 
1 16.28  0.19 683  126845.7  402  683 126846  574  683 126846  747 
3 18.38  0.88 771  105486.3  513  771 105486  732  771 105486  952 
5 26.19  0.63 1098  115691.8  1040  1098 115692  1486  1098 115692  1931 
7 27.75  0.56 1164  105146  1168  1164 105146  1669  1164 105146  2170 
9 29.12  0.79 1221  143536.9  1286  1221 143537  1837  1221 143537  2388 
11 31.04  0.70 1302  137470.7  1462  1302 137471  2088  1302 137471  2714 
13 33.89  0.89 1421  104847  1742  1421 104847  2488  1421 104847  3235 
15 36.68  0.85 1538  107079  2041  1538 107079  2915  1538 107079  3790 
17 37.19  0.47 1559  147871  2097  1559 147871  2996  1559 147871  3895 
19 43.13  0.87 1808  135085.9  2821  1808 135086  4030  1808 135086  5239 
21 43.95  0.92 1843  127284.2  2930  1843 127284  4185  1843 127284  5441 
23 47.48  0.92 1991  121109.3  3419  1991 121109  4884  1991 121109  6350 
25 49.55  0.73 2077  136019.1  3723  2077 136019  5318  2077 136019  6914 







Table 3. The Optimal Results of Individual Crop Insurance 
      Low Risk Level  Moderate Risk Level  High Risk Level 
Farm Beta Corr  A1  Ynet deltaU  A1 Ynet deltaU  A1 Ynet deltaU 
1 16.28  0.19  0  126169 0  422 126384  45  919 125839  279 
3 18.38  0.88  0  104975 0  179 105254  9  725 104545  187 
5 26.19  0.63  373  113186  121  836 113449  868  1000 113010  1890 
7 27.75  0.56  503  100285  352  1000 100285  2093  1000 100285  4180 
9 29.12  0.79  733  139435  845  1000 139435  2806  1000 139435  4878 
11 31.04  0.70  443  134836  154  944 134983  1003  1000 134836  2090 
13 33.89  0.89  589  101316  575  915 101563  1979  1000 101257  3627 
15 36.68  0.85  635  103082  753  956 103260  2438  1000 103082  4362 
17 37.19  0.47  792  144489  1233  1000 144489  3089  1000 144489  5031 
19 43.13  0.87  670  130959  653  1000 130959  2474  1000 130959  4455 
21 43.95  0.92  780  124281  1427  972 124365  3167  1000 124281  5014 
23 47.48  0.92  703  116748  966  1000 116748  3002  1000 116748  5212 
25 49.55  0.73  778  131413  1231  1000 131413  3590  1000 131413  6049 
27 52.27  0.87  716  98038  1256  1000 98038  3754  1000 98038  6449 
 
Table 4. The Optimal Portfolio of Weather Index and Individual Crop Insurance 
      Low Risk Level  Moderate Risk Level  High Risk Level 
Farm Beta Corr  n  A1  Ynet  deltaU  n A1 Ynet deltaU  n A1 Ynet deltaU 
1 16.28  0.19  683  0  126846  402  670 138 126694  579  625 654 126129  883 
3 18.38  0.88  771  0  105486  513  771 0 105486  732  771 0 105486  952 
5 26.19  0.63  1098 0  115692  1040  944 243 115039  1530  682 657 113930  2351 
7 27.75  0.56  1164 0  105146  1168  634 747 101513  2437  455 1000 100285  4512 
9 29.12  0.79  1173  44 143355  1287  150 1000 139435  2833  150 1000 139435  4914 
11 31.04  0.70  1302  0  137471  1462  1302 0  137471  2088  959 514 136118  2912 
13 33.89  0.89  1421  0  104847  1742  1384 30  104739  2489  390 841 101828  3704 
15 36.68  0.85  1538  0  107079  2041  1242 236  106137  2956  445 871 103600  4505 
17 37.19  0.47  1280  390 146551  2330  1042 723  145427  4135  914 902 144822  6199 
19 43.13  0.87  1808  0  135086  2821  1808 0  135086  4030  1283 465  133167  5381 
21 43.95  0.92  1843  0  127284  2930  1843 0  127284  4185  1380 305  126368  5502 
23 47.48  0.92  1991  0  121109  3419  1991 0  121109  4884  1991 0  121109  6350 
25 49.55  0.73  2077  0  136019  3723  1774 269  134781  5415  1325 667  132949  7686 
27 52.27  0.87  2191  0  103267  4144  2191 0  103267  5919  1719 323  101579  7812 
 